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requiring us to fill in and complete the work, but instead, it welcomes partici-
pation through a form of safety and comfort in numbers — big numbers. To
be clear, I don’t think this book is there yet. Instead of comprehensive and
exhaustive, it needs to be more obsessive and excessive. The next monograph
(and I have zero doubts that there will be more) would have even more cat-
egories, more contributing essays, more projects, more pages, more books,
more drawings, more people, more trees, and less structure. Given the
number of works Bhatia has produced in such a short time, coupled with the
number of people he has mobilised, I feel confident that he will be able to
achieve a new collective form of overly abundant pluralism. The Open Work-
shop is positioned to do it.
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Timothy Hyde’s Ugliness and Judgment: On Architecture in the Public Eye offers
a wide-ranging account of architecture in Britain over the past three centuries.
Hyde’s goal, however, is not to offer a survey of Britain’s finest architectural
achievements. His goal is not even, in fact, to offer a definitive list of Britain’s
ugliest buildings (such a survey, depending on whom you ask, might actually
run for hundreds of passages in itself). Instead, Hyde is interested in what judg-
ments about architectural ugliness do, and have done historically. His funda-
mental contention is that ‘the judgment of ugliness signals the participation
of architecture in a social circumstance in which resolution is not achieved by
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aesthetic means’ (p. 184). As a result, Hyde’s book is not about ugliness per se,
but about the social utility of such judgments. He is thus predictably eager to
avoid a precise definition of ugliness, for judgments of ugliness are not, for
Hyde, a productive end. As he writes, ‘[t]he aim of this investigation into archi-
tecture and ugliness is […] not to define ugliness in itself, but to expand contem-
porary debate on the instrumentality of aesthetic judgment’ (p. 3). This is a wise
decision, one that moves his project away from a survey of irreconcilable aes-
thetic preferences — Neoclassicism versus Brutalism, stone versus concrete —
towards a more interdisciplinary engagement with ugliness as a heuristic for dis-
cussing how architecture is ‘a catalyst for debate on a broader social circum-
stance of change or conflict’ (p. 185). This is also why he argues that
aesthetic judgment, ‘though more often assumed to exist at a remove from
social realities, cannot readily be separated from other modes of judgment’,
including the laws and legal processes studied throughout Ugliness and Judg-
ment, which are ‘instruments’ for negotiating ‘contested circumstances’ (p.
185). The result is that ‘aesthetic interpretation and sociocultural analysis’
become strange, and yet productive, bedfellows in Hyde’s account:
With ugliness understood not as an aesthetic value but as a social judgment,
exploring architectural ugliness brings to light an understanding of the social
instrumentality of architecture, revealing its unacknowledged relationships to a
variety of nonarchitectural protocols or structures in law, or science, or politics
that organize social and political life. (p. 3)
Hyde’s primary focus is thus on the social consequences rather than aesthetic
dimensions of ugliness: how architecture participates in the ‘civic realm’ (p. 185).
Hyde nonetheless directly addresses the concept of ‘ugliness’, but resists defin-
ing it philosophically into existence as a quality in itself. His account of ugliness is
indebted to a range of thinkers. He begins with the nineteenth-century German
philosopher Karl Rosenkranz’s definition that the ‘aesthetically ugly’ is produced
by ‘formlessness’, ‘incorrectness’, and ‘deformation’, before moving on to more
recent conceptions by Gretchen Henderson, and Mark Cousins. Both insist on
the ‘relational’ or ‘subjective’ qualities of ugliness, denying that ugliness is a
thing in itself. For Henderson, ugliness is ‘the encounter between something
and its limit […] and more precisely the transgression of [the] boundary of sep-
aration’. As a result, ugliness is neither ‘an inherent quality’ nor ‘a singular sub-
jective response’, Hyde argues, but the ‘changeable relation between things,
between people, or between people and things that constitutes the texture of
culture’ (p. 6). For Cousins, Hyde writes, ‘ugliness should be measured not as
an absence or a negative — as in a lack of beauty — but as a presence,
indeed often as an excess of presence’ (p. 7). Again, what is important for
Hyde here is not to define ugliness per se, but to point our attention to a critical
aspect of ugliness: that it is incapable, in Rosenkranz’s words, of ‘aesthetic self-
reliance’, precisely because it is relational. As a result, ugliness remains ‘bound
up with the real’, and so it must be explored not theoretically but ‘along the
horizon that composes the difficult reality of architecture’:
the realities of the norms, institutions, and standards of expectation that precede
architecture. Ugliness in architecture may act perceptibly and consequentially
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upon these realities, and therefore it is reciprocally such actions that are fore-
grounded in those frequent instances when the judgment of ugliness is cast
upon architecture. (p. 8)
This argument might sound abstract, but it has important consequences for
how we should think about judgments of architectural ugliness in practice:
not as merely aesthetic preferences, articulated through idiosyncratic individual
tastes, but as expressions of what Hyde calls ‘civic aesthetics’ (p. 8). Following his
more theoretical introduction, Hyde deals with a stunning range of architectural
events across the succeeding seven chapters — from proposals and planning
debates to retrospective assessments of individual structures across the last
300 years (and at times all the way back to Stonehenge). Those incidents
include eighteenth-century Bath as a kind of pre-history of ‘civic space’
(p. 15), the ‘emerging civil constitution of towns and their society’, instantiated
through architecture; how the materiality of stone and brick became an instru-
ment for the negotiation of nuisance law and urban space; the later twentieth-
century ‘collective affect’ or irritation in response to the ‘awareness that ugliness
was the architectural average of London’ and the challenges of New Brutalism,
and especially the South Bank Arts Centre; the changing nature of libel law in
the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the permissibility of see-
mingly ad hominem criticisms of architectural ugliness; and the emergence of
the architect as a ‘corporate body’ (p. 139), explored in part through the
Mansion House Square debate over a plan for a building by the then recently
deceased Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, which failed to be approved and which
eventually resulted in Sir James Stirling’s No. 1 Poultry. In each instance, the
debate over ugliness is seemingly spurred on by aesthetic concerns. But, as
Hyde shows, each event is intimately tied up with, and supervenes on, larger
debates — about civil society and civic spaces — that were often worked out
(at least to some degree) legally.
Each of those debates — of which I have been able to offer only the most
schematic overview — is too rich, multifaceted, and complicated to discuss in
depth. One example will have to suffice in giving a sense of the breadth and
inventiveness of Hyde’s arguments. The focus of Ugliness and Judgment’s
fourth chapter is ‘incongruity’. Hyde begins with the architectural historian Sir
John Summerson, in 1945, positively evaluating the deliberate ugliness of
William Butterfield’s nineteenth-century Gothic Revival buildings. This brief vign-
ette allows Hyde to home in on the link between style and temporality: not only
stylistic change, over time, but also ‘changing judgments’. ‘When a single
architectural circumstance bridges different historical periods’, Hyde argues,
‘style becomes an uncertain analytical instrument’ (p. 91). His case in point is
the wrangling that ensued when, in 1967, the Reverend Chad Varah and one
of his churchwardens commissioned a new altar from Henry Moore for St
Stephen Walbrook, one of the small parish churches razed by the Great Fire
of London in 1666, and quickly rebuilt, starting in 1672, after a design by Sir
Christopher Wren. Importantly, Wren’s ‘aesthetic solutions were inseparable
from their social intention and consequence’: ‘the unified arrangement [was]
the aesthetic corollary of the social effect of communal congregation’ (p. 93).
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The church’s dome, for instance, permitted the entire congregation to hear both
the liturgy and the sermon, just as its shape allowed parishioners, in their pew
boxes, to view the pulpit.
Within this classically proportioned church, Varah wanted something not
modern but ‘primitive’ fromMoore: what he called a ‘quintessential, archetypal,
rough hewn altar of the Old Testament’ (p. 95). Moore’s resulting altar — a
giant travertine cylinder, three-and-a-half feet tall, eight feet wide, with
gently undulating grooves — was completed in the 1970s, and finally ready
to be installed in the 1980s. First, though, St. Stephen Walbrook needed per-
mission from the diocesan authorities. Suddenly, that legal-ecclesiastical
debate about the installation of a new altar, seemingly centred on a theological
issue, took on aesthetic dimensions: not whether Wren’s church or Moore’s
altar were beautiful — the chancellor in charge of the proceedings was
happy to grant that in both instances— but whether the ‘two things’were ‘con-
gruent’. In the end, the chancellor concluded that aesthetic criteria, while impor-
tant, were insufficient to render judgment. The real question was not one of
beauty; the real question was whether Moore’s sculpture was a ‘table’ or an
‘altar’. The distinction, while seemingly trivial, had important liturgical and theo-
logical implications. Three hundred years after St Stephen Walbrook had been
built, liturgical practices had radically shifted. Communion occurred more fre-
quently, altars had been moved to the centre of the congregational body,
and boxes had been replaced by seats and benches. Moreover, since at least
the 1550s, the Eucharist in Anglican churches had taken place in front of not
a sacrificial altar but a table in a feast modelled after the Last Supper.
This precise debate — over tables versus altars — had already in fact taken
place in 1845 during the restoration of the Round Church in Cambridge. In
that instance, after the Arches Court (a higher ecclesiastical court) had
debated the appropriateness of an immovable stone altar, it was decided that
the ‘uniformity of liturgical practices [,] the consistency of rituals performed
within different Anglican churches’, took precedence over issues of architectural
style, uniformity and consistency. As Hyde writes of the incident, ‘[t]he judgment
of ugliness in this case would not be a judgment of appearance […] but a judg-
ment of consequences— incongruity as impropriety or ineffectiveness’ (p. 105).
Similar reasoning held in 1986 in the Consistory Court, which decided that
Moore’s structure violated the ‘spatial perfection of the church’, and failed to
meet ‘the canonical requirements for a holy table’. Varah and his churchwarden
appealed to the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reversed (an even higher court
than the Arches Court), which rejected the ‘aesthetic’ arguments of the
witnesses in the earlier hearings (p. 106) and concluded that Moore’s ‘altar
falls within the wide bounds of what can reasonably be called a holy table’
(pp. 106–7). The incident is important, Hyde argues, because these ‘attempted
juridical reconciliations’ give ‘deeper substance to the visible incongruities of
postmodernism’: ‘it was a judgment of ugliness that prompted the need for
such reconciliations to be attempted’ (p. 109).
The scope of Hyde’s book is breathtaking, both in its historical range and in
the far-reaching implications of its arguments and conclusions. But it is also a
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work preoccupied with charming details and quirky characters: the shared man-
agement of medieval cesspits; the eighteenth-century Ugly Face Club; architect
Sir John Soane’s foolhardy attempts to sue his aesthetic critics for libel; the hap-
hazard rebuilding of the Houses of Parliament in the nineteenth century, thanks
to the discovery that magnesian limestone, which had been chosen for its ‘dura-
bility’ (p. 52), was in fact ‘highly susceptible’ to the corrosive effects of London’s
acidic atmosphere; and the ongoing meddling of Charles, the Prince of Wales, in
his opposition to modern (and especially postmodern) architectural styles. What
sounds like an abstract argument about ‘civic aesthetics’ in Hyde’s opening
pages thus quickly finds expression in carefully told stories about individual
architects, their advocates, and their opponents. What Hyde has produced is
not simply a book about architecture and aesthetic judgment, but a work of
extensive historicism, and a model of interdisciplinary engagement. Moreover,
Ugliness and Judgment is a joy to read. Hyde is a lucid and charismatic writer.
He has provided a thought-provoking meditation on the social and legal func-
tions of ugliness, and on the instrumentality of aesthetic judgment itself. For
those looking to understand what such judgments do societally, and what
they have done historically, there might be no better guide to ugliness than
Hyde’s beautifully written book.
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